Sudan at war: A litmus test for the African Union’s aspiration for “a peaceful and secure Africa”

"Hope in short supply as fighting in South Sudan escalates ahead of decisive Addis peace talks" by UNMISS MEDIA is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

In 2013 as part of the 50th Anniversary commemorations of the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the African Union (AU) adopted the “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want” Framework (Agenda 2063).

Agenda 2063 acknowledges the gains made by the AU and its successor, the OAU, and outlines the seven aspirations of the African continent to be achieved by the year 2063. Aspiration 4 of the blueprint is “a peaceful and secure Africa,” and one of the goals of aspiration 4 is to “silence the guns in Africa by 2020.” This target was not met by the end of December 2020. For that reason, it was extended to 2030 with periodic reviews.

It has previously been asserted that the AU’s target to silence the guns is a pipe dream, bearing in mind the governance issues which leave the African continent prone to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) particularly through military coups, which in turn lead to armed conflict.

The recently erupted war in Sudan highlights the difficulties that the AU faces in its quest to eradicate conflict and to silence the guns on the African continent. This is despite a comprehensive AU Framework to respond to UCGs.

The Genesis of the War in Sudan.

Sudan has experienced the highest number of military coups in Africa since it attained independence in 1958, with six successful and ten attempted coups to date. In April 2019, following months of protests, long-time ruler Omar Al-Bashir was ousted in a military coup. Instrumental to the ouster of Al Bashir was the military alongside a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The RSF, which has been accused of committing human rights violations against civilians both before and after the 2019 and 2021 military coups, has its roots in the 1980s Janjaweed militia, and by the 2010s it had evolved into an organized group that fought alongside the Sudanese army during the Darfur war. General Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo, also known as Hemdti, commands it. In the aftermath of Al Bashir’s ouster, the military promised a smooth transition. In November 2019, a governing Sovereign Council consisting of members of the military and civilians was appointed, and Abdullah Hamdock became Prime Minister.

In October 2021, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan staged another military coup, ousting Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdock and dissolving the Sovereign Council. A new Sovereign Council was named in November 2021 with Al-Burhan and Hemedti retaining their positions as leader and deputy, respectively. Subsequently, the civilian members of the Council were dismissed.

In both military coups, the AU intervened based on its framework for responding to UCG, suspending Sudan’s membership both in 2019 and in 2021 pending a return to a civilian-led transitional government. In January 2022 the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) called on the military to ensure a return to civilian rule within 6 to 12 months.

In the aftermath of the 2021 coup, tensions were brewing between Al-Burhan and Hemedti. A political framework agreement that was scheduled to be signed on 1 April 2023 was not signed due to in-fighting between Hamdock and Hemedti. Amongst the issues causing disagreements, Al-Burhan and Hemedti could not find common ground on the timetable and modalities of the incorporation of RSF members in the army. In addition, Hemedti accused Al-Burhan of giving key positions to members of Al Bashir’s former government and plotting to eliminate him from the political arena. The United States of America was closely involved in the collapsed negotiations.

Fighting erupted between the army and the RSF in the capital city, Khartoum, on 15 April 2023. A humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Sudan with about 334 000 people reported to have been internally displaced since fighting began. A further 100 000 people including Sudanese citizens, refugees from countries including Eritrea and South Sudan, and migrants from other countries have left the country. As of 29 April 2023, the civilian death toll had surpassed 400. It has been observed that countries including Libya and Russia are fuelling the conflict.

The AU’s Role in Ending the Conflict in Sudan

The AU has in recent times consistently called on the continent to resort to “African solutions to African problems.” This position is largely informed by the realization by African leaders that over-dependence on external parties including Western superpowers can hinder the effective and timely resolution of problems that affect the continent.

In response to both the 2019 and 2021 military coups, the AU Peace and Security Council condemned this unconstitutional change of government and suspended Sudan from the activities of the Organisation pending the return to civilian rule. This is in line with Article 25 (1) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance.

However, despite the AU’s playing a prominent role in negotiations between General Al-Burhan and General Hemedti, its mediatory role was unsuccessful in the wake of the war. The question to be asked in this regard is: Is the AU’s quest for a peaceful and secure Africa feasible?

In the aftermath of the break out of the war on 15 April, the AU condemned the violence and called for coordinated international efforts to end the armed conflict. The AU is guided by the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is a political concept that empowers the AU to defer action to the regional bloc in response to conflict with the AU only stepping in when the regional bloc has failed. In the days following the outbreak of fighting, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is the regional bloc for the Horn of Africa countries, identified mediators for Sudan, thus, the Presidents of Kenya, South Sudan, and Djibouti.

On 3 May 2023, the head of the Arab League Dafa’alla Al-Haj Ali met with Burhan’s representative in Cairo. He warned against external interference in the conflict, which he said is an “internal matter.” Given the humanitarian, peace, and security crisis unfolding in Sudan, this conflict cannot reasonably be labeled as an “internal matter.”

The Horn of Africa is already grappling with instability following the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia and the instability in Chad and Central African Republic amongst others. In this regard, it is important for the AU to intervene and prevent further escalation of hostilities.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union provides in article 4 (h) that the AU can intervene at the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council in a member state, where war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are perpetrated. War crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in Sudan, given that more than 400 civilians have died and more than 2000 have been injured since the fighting began. Therefore, in line with the AU’s policy shift from non-interference to non-indifference, the AU is well-placed to intervene. Accordingly, the AU in collaboration with the United Nations (UN) and IGAD  announced that the AU has agreed with international actors to work towards a complete ceasefire in Sudan.

What next for Sudan?

On 16 April 2023, the AUPSC held a meeting on the situation in Sudan. Subsequently, a high-level global meeting convened by the AU on 20 April 2023 followed. The participants included the UN Secretary-General, IGAD Executive Secretary, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5), African members of the UN Security Council (A3), Sudan’s neighboring countries and Comoros as the AU Chair. On 2 May 2023, the AU Commission Chairperson Mr. Moussa Faki who has traveled to Sudan 5 times in recent years to engage with the civilian and military parties convened another follow-up meeting.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia-US facilitated talks began in Jeddah on 6 May 2023. The AU Commission Chairperson issued a statement saying that he is closely following the ‘talks’ and urged the parties to agree to a humanitarian ceasefire to allow relief to reach civilians. He also reiterated that the parties to the conflict must comply with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law and “permanently silence the guns in the supreme interest of the people of Sudan.”

Although the Saudi Arabia-US mediation is welcome as it may help to end the conflict, the AU should remain seized with the matter and continue to play a leading role in finding a lasting solution to the crisis in Sudan. The intervention contemplated in the Constitutive Act includes the deployment of a peacekeeping force.

Since both warring sides in Sudan have failed to respect the terms of the ceasefire agreements, perhaps it is time for IGAD and the AU to consider deploying a peacekeeping force in Sudan. This happened in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique, where SADC deployed the Southern Africa Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). Deployment of a peacekeeping force would serve to protect civilians from gross human rights violations by both parties to the conflict. Also, it would serve the AU’s lofty ideal of a peaceful and secure Africa.

Linda Mushoriwa

Dr. Linda Mushoriwa is a researcher at the African Centre for Transnational Criminal Justice (ACTCJ) at the University of the Western Cape. She obtained her Ph.D. in International Criminal law from the University of KwaZulu Natal in 2019. Her research interests are international criminal justice and international law with a particular focus on the African Union; peace and security in Africa; and women’s and children’s rights.

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